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I
LEwIsInTION
A LTHOUGH New York's Estates, Powers and Trusts Larw1 was the only
major statutory revision to become effective during the period under
review, the trend toward legislative revision and codification of probate and
succession law has not yet run its course. Completion of the new Uniform
Probate Code by the joint American Bar Association and National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws committees vll un-
doubtedly spur additional legislative action.2
Codification of succession law requires review and drafting procedures
which inevitably produce new provisions designed to clarify or change
existing statutory or case law. Comparable amendments to probate, admin-
istrative, and intestate succession statutes are not infrequent in those states
which have not undertaken systematic codification. Not surprisingly, some
of these amendments have generated litigation.
A 1953 New Jersey enactment,3 recently litigated, provided that
adopted children should no longer be entitled to inherit from their natural
parents. A proviso was added to prevent the new statute from affecting
"any adoption granted or any right or duty vested or established under any
law heretofore in effect."' The New Jersey Supreme Court held that a child
adopted prior to 1953 could inherit her natural mother's intestate estate
even though the mother died in 19640 The court relied heavily on the
saving clause as a manifestation of legislative intent that the 1953 amend-
ment should not be applicable to prior adoptions, even though the natural
parent's death might occur subsequently.6 Other decisions construing stat-
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1. The N.Y. EPTL, effective September 1, 1967, is the subejct of a symposium in 33
Bklyn. L. Rev. 405-573 (1967).
2. At this writing, the project is scheduled for completion in 1969.
3. NJ. Stat. Ann. § 9:3-30 (1960).
4. NJ. Stat. Ann. § 9:3-34 (1960).
5. Nickell v. Gall, 49 NJ. 186, 229 A.2d 511 (1967).
6. The court did not hold that the adopted child acquired a "vested right' to in.
herit from her natural mother at the time of adoption. Rather, it held that the legisature,
in enacting the saving clause, did not intend a technical interpretation to auach to its
usage of "right or duty vested or established." 49 NJ. at 190, 229 A.2d at 513. Tho
court also pointed to the fact that the original adoption decree had exprecJsy excepted
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utes changing the status of adopted or illegitimate children, while reaffirm-
ing the ineffectiveness of amendments which occur after a testator's death,7
have nevertheless emphasized the more liberal trend motivating and under-
lying legislation in this field.'
In 1956, Virginia repealed its statute providing that subsequent mar-
riage of the maker revokes his will. A testatrix executed her will in 1936,
married in 1937, and died in 1965. The Supreme Court of Virginia held
that the will was revoked upon her marriage and not revived by the repeal
of the statute.9
Perhaps the most remarkable decision concerning change of law was
Fullam v. Brock.10 An earlier decision,11 in 1962, had held unconstitutional
a statute12 purporting to grant husbands the right to dissent from the wills of
their wives. In 1964, the North Carolina Constitution 8 was amended so as
to grant the legislature the power to enact such a statute. 4 In 1965, the
original statute was re-enacted.' 5 The testatrix died, however, 3 months
the "right of inheritance" from a statement of general dissolution of the parcnt.child
relationship. It felt that this justified inclusion of a make-weight argument that the
natural mother "may have relied" on this exception in "omitting a will." 49 NJ. at 191,
229 A.2d at 514. Perhaps even more significant, though not commented upon in the
opinion, is the fact that the claimant was the decedent's only child; the next of kin
were three sisters and a brother.
7. In re Estate of Graham, 150 N.W.2d 816 (Mich. 1967). A testamentary trust
bequeathed the remainder after a life estate to issue of the body of the life tenant.
Thirty-one years after the settler's death, but 6 years before the death of the life tenant,
the adoption law was amended to include adopted children as issue. Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 27.3178 (1962). See In re Estate of Miner, 359 Mich. 579, 103 N.W.2d 498 (1960). In
Graham, the Supreme Court of Michigan states that: "It was not competent for the
legislature to change [the testator's] will in that respect by statutory amendment adopted
after his death." 150 N.W.2d at 818.
8. In n re Will of Van Nostrand, 53 Misc. 2d 835, 279 N.Y.S.2d 806 (Sur. Ct. 1967),
the court rejected an argument that the enactment in 1965 of N.Y. Deced. Est. Law
§ 83-a (now N.Y. EPTL § 4-12), providing for legitimation by order of filiation, changed
or revoked the prior provisions of N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 24 to the extent that marriage
of the parents effected legitimation. The court limited the applicability of the now
statute to cases where the illegitimate's parents had not subsequently married.
9. Wilson v. Francis, 208 Va. 83, 155 S.E.2d 49 (1967).
10. 271 N.C. 145, 155 S.E.2d 737 (1967).
11. Dudley v. Staton, 257 N.C. 572, 126 S.E_2d 590 (1962).
12. Ch. 959, § 1 [1961] N.C. Sess. Laws 1260-61.
13. N.C. Const. art. X, § 6 (1868) provided that the property of a female "may be
devised and bequeathed, and, with the written assent of her husband, convoyed by her
as if she were unmarried." Dudley v. Staton held that the clause "as if she were un-
married" modified the verbs "devised and bequeathed" as well as "convoyed," 257 N.C.
at 580-81, 126 S.E.2d at 596-97. As so construed, the provision invalidated any legislativo
attempt to restrict the power of testation of a married woman by provisions to which a
single testatrix would not be subject. :
14. The words "as if she were unmarried" were deleted, and in their place the
words "subject to such regulations and limitations as the General Assembly may pro.
scribe" were substituted. N.C. Const. art. X, § 6.
15. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 30-1 (1967).
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before the effective date of the re-enactment; the question presented was
whether or not her husband had the right to dissent from her wll. The court
held that the adoption of the constitutional amendment "restored" the hus-
band's right of dissent,16 and supported its reasoning by citing inapposite
decisions l" validating statutes whose effectiveness was expressly conditioned
upon the subsequent passage of a constitutional amendment; it ignored pre-
vailing concepts as to the effect of a declaration of unconstitutionality"8 and
the fact that the constitutional amendment utilized prospective terminology
in its grant of legislative power."9
II
CHOICE OF LAw
Choice-of-law problems can arise with respect to the estate of any
decedent owning property located in a jurisdiction other than his domicile,
or whose spouse is domiciled in another jurisdiction, or who has made an
inter vivos transfer to a nondomieiliary transferee as a "testamentary sub-
stitute."' 2 Related problems such as jurisdiction and full faith and credit
are also often raised. While extended discussion of the topic should be
deferred to authorities in the field of conflict of laws, it may be appropriate,
nevertheless, to present a sample of the choice-of-lav problems in succession
that have been litigated during the Survey year.
Several cases have drawn -harp distinctions between real and per-
16. 271 N.C. at 151, 155 S.E.2d at 741. The legislature had expresAy provided that
its re-enactment of the statute should not be construed as a determination of the in-
validity of the statute in the interim. Id.
17. E.g., Druggan v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 36 (1925). There, Congress specified that
a particular enactment should not become effective until I year after ratification of the
eighteenth amendment. It was passed in contemplation of subsequent ratification, and
could not become effective without ratification. These considerations did not obtain ith
respect to the original adoption of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 30-1 (1967).
18. An unbroken line of North Carolina cases had followed the lead of the U.S.
Supreme Court and established the proposition that an unconstitutional lay is no law.
See e.g., Board of Managers of James Walker Memorial Hesp. v. City of Wilmington,
237 N.C. 179, 74 S.E.2d 749 (1953); Sessions v. Columbus County, 214 N.C. 634, 200
S.E. 418 (1939); State v. Williams, 146 N.C. 618, 61 S.E. 61 (1903). In Roberson v.
Penland, 260 N.C. 502, 133 S.E.2d 206 (1963), the court held that a compromise agrce.
meat executed in reliance on the validity of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 30-1 viould remain in force
despite the subsequent declaration of the statute's invalidity in the Dudley case. This
holding in no way affected the status of the statute; it was a determination that the
agreement is valid despite the statute's invalidity.
19. See notes 13-14 supra.
20. New York employs this terminology in EPTL § 5-1.1(b), in subjecting varions
inter vivos transfers to the surviving spouse's right of election.
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sonal property in connection with choice of law. The holographic will of a
Florida domiciliary, invalid in Florida, was held admissible to probate in
Virginia; as so probated, it controlled the disposition of testator's Virginia
real estate.2 ' A New Jersey widow, who had no right to elect against her
husband's will in New Jersey (where he died domiciled), could nevertheless
elect against it and take a dower interest in Ohio realty owned by the
decedent at his death.22 A Texas decedent's son was entitled, under the
New Mexico pretermitted heir statute, to an interest in real property located
in New Mexico, even though he was not so entitled under the Texas pre-
termitted child statute.' A Czechoslovakian domiciliary, residuary bene-
ficiary of the estate of another Czech, died prior to distribution of her share
of his estate. Her share included real estate located in New York, which was
sold by the executor (under a discretionary power of sale) prior to her
death. The proceeds were available to satisfy her legacy, but if they were
characterized as realty, they would pass to her niece and grand-niece under
New York law; if personalty, they would be bona vacantia under Czech
law. A New York surrogate held that the proceeds could not lose their
character as realty until actually distributed by the executor, and ordered
the decedent's share paid to her niece and grand-niece.24
The most interesting case of the Survey year turned on a different
issue than characterization of assets. The bulk of a Virginia decedent's assets
were located in New York, and his will provided that as to such assets, New
York law should govern.25 Under New York law, the testamentary provi-
sions for the spouse were sufficient to bar her election of a forced share.
Under Virginia law, however, she had an absolute right to elect against the
will. 26 New York's appellate division held that she could assert this right
of election against the New York assets." The court conceded that "where
the law of her domicile gives a widow no right to take against the will, she
gains none from the fact that the property and administration are in a
jurisdiction where there is such a right,""8 but held that the decedent's domi-
ciliary state can validly limit his right to dispose of his property by will.
21. French v. Short, 207 Va. 548, 151 S.E.2d 354 (1966).
22. Pfau v. Moseley, 9 Ohio St. 2d 13, 222 N.E.2d 639 (1966).
23. Price v. Johnson, 78 N.M. 123, 428 P.2d 978 (1967).
24. In re Matous' Estate, 53 Misc. 2d 255, 278 N.Y.S.2d 70 (Sur. Ct. 1967). Tho
issue was apparently one of first impression in New York. For a similar ruling, sBo
Succession of King, 201 So. 2d 335 (La. App. 1967).
25. The applicable section was N.Y. Deced. Est. Law § 17 [now EPTL § 3-5.1(h) .
26. Va. Code Ann. §§ 64-13, 64-16 (1950).
27. In re Clark's Will, 28 App. Div. 2d 55, 281 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1st Dep't 1967).
28. Id. at 57, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 183. This dictum is squarely contrary to Pfau v.
Moseley, 9 Ohio St. 2d 13, 222 N.E.2d 354 (1966) discussed in tho text accompanying
note 22 supra.
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Two leading decisions suggesting a contrary resulf2 were distinguished on
the ground that the surviving spouse in each case had agreed to or adopted
the decedents election of New York law as to assets located in New York.
The issue would have been more complex had the surviving spouse been
a resident of a third state, under whose law she would not be entitled to
a right of election.
NONTESTAmENTARY SUCCESSION
Surviving Spouse.-Appellate courts in Maryland and Tennessee strug-
gled with the effect of inter vivos transfers and arrangements on the surviv-
ing spouse's forced share. In the Tennessee case,30 the decedent irrevocably
transferred personal property aggregating more than one-third of his estate to
two sisters as trustees for himself for life, with principal to be distributed at
his death to five brothers and sisters. At his death, the widow claimed a
distributive share of this property under a fraudulent conveyance statute.3 '
In upholding her claim, the court pointed to factors32 which suggested an
application of the old New York illusory transfer test. 3 In the Maryland
case, 4 the decedent established two savings account trusts for the benefit
of his nieces and nephews more than 10 years prior to his death. Al-
though modest at first, the balances grew with additional deposits and the
accumulated dividends and constituted almost half of his total estate at
the time of his death. The court concluded that the decedent's purpose in
establishing the accounts "was to divide his belongings equally between his
widow and the children of his sister,"3 but nevertheless found no fraud
on the widow's marital rights. The inconsistent results reached in these
similar cases suggest the need for more specific guidelines in the deter-
mining of fraudulent or colorable inter vivos transfers8
The question of whether assets subject to a valid contract to bequeath
may be reached by a surviving spouse raises serious and complex policy
29. Wyatt v Fulrath, 16 N.Y.2d 169, 211 N.E.2d 637, 264 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1965);
In re Smith's Estate, 182 Misc. 711,48 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sur. Ct. 1944).
30. Sherrill v. I.llicote, 417 S.W.2d 798 (Tenn. App. 1967).
31. Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-612 (1955).
32. Le., absence of consideration for the inter vivos transfer, retention of a life
estate, no actual management by the trustees during settlor's lifetime, and size of tiust
in relation to total estate. 417 S.W.2d at 801-02.
33. See Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937). See generally W. Mac-
Donald, Fraud on the Widow's Share (1960).
34. Klosiewski v. Slovan Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 230 A.2d 285 (Afd. Ct. App. 1967).
35. Id. at 288.
36. N.Y. EPTL § 5-1.1(b) specifies that certain inter vivos transfers are subject
to the surviving spouse's forced share regardless of intent.
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issues as to each jurisdiction's statutory provisions for surviving spouses.
If specific assets are transferred to a promisor, solely in consideration of
his promise to bequeath them to a beneficiary of the transferor's choosing,
the protective policy underlying forced shares statutes would not be seriously
impaired by a holding that the spouse cannot share in such assets. If, how-
ever, the promisor contracts to bequeath assets which he has himself ac-
quired, retaining full power to transfer or consume them during his life-
time, the underlying policy of the forced share statute may be seriously
impaired by such a decision. And if the decedent obligates himself to be-
queath his entire estate, such a holding -would nullify the statute, com-
pletely frustrating its objectives. Since the forced share concept is designed
to operate irrespective of the decedent's intent, or even in spite of a con-
trary intent, it should be unnecessary for the spouse to prove that the con-
tract was entered into with specific intent to deprive him or her of a
distributive share.
An intermediate California court recently held that the beneficiary of a
contract to devise specifically described property takes it to the exclusion
of the surviving spouse. r If the court's interpretation of the applicable
statute38 is correct, California residents can retain possession of and con-
trol over their separate property during their lifetimes, passing it on at
death free of a surviving spouse's claim. The legislature should take notice
that this is the precise contingency against which a surviving spouse most
needs and deserves protection.
The potential for frustration of this policy has increased in New York
after Rubenstein v. Mueller.89 The contract, between the decedent and his
first wife, was embodied in a joint and mutual will bequeathing the estate of
the first decedent to the survivor; "the estate of the second decedent" was
then bequeathed to several named beneficiaries. Decedent survived his first
wife and remarried. After his death, his second wife unsuccessfully claimed a
statutory share in property which he bad acquired during his first marriage
and had held jointly with his first wife during her lifetime. Since the de-
cedent retained possession, ownership, and control over this property until
his death, the result is as disturbing as that discussed above with respect to
California.4"
Surviving spouses, claiming a forced share in the decedent's estate
despite an antenuptial agreement releasing such claims, were unsuccessful
37. In re Estate of Stewart, 63 Cal. Rptr. 548 (Cal. App. 1967).
38. Cal. Prob. Code § 70.
39. 19 N.Y.2d 228, 225 N.E.2d 540, 278 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1967).
40. In both cases, a long and apparently harmonious first marriage was followed by
a short one that was terminated by the husband's death. The courts wore, in effect,
preferring relatives of the first wife over the second wife. But there is no indication that
the rule established in each case will be limited to similar fact situations.
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this Survey year in upsetting the agreement where they could shou only a
failure by the decedent to disclose the full extent of his wealtlh.4 One spouse
who did succeed was able to prove actual misrepresentation of assets.42 It
is significant that each court commented upon the education and business
acumen of the complainant. Disparities between the claimant and the de-
cedent in these respects were discovered only in the case where the spouse
was successful.
Creditors.--The year's most interesting fraudulent transfer case arose
in New York 43 By separation agreement with his first wife, the decedent
promised: (1) to bequeath one-half of his estate to his son; (2) to make
the son beneficiary of several life insurance policies; and (3) if he should
make any inter vivos transfers, to pay his son a sum equal to one-half of
the amounts so transferred. In violation of the agreement, the decedent
changed beneficiaries of some of the policies, established revocable inter
vivos trusts and joint mutual fund accounts giving a right of survivor-Jaip to
his second wife, and bequeathed his entire estate to her.
The son asserted that the trusts and mutual fund accounts were trans-
fers in fraud on his rights as a creditor of the decedent. Although he pre-
vailed as to the trusts, because of their revocability, 44 the mutual fund ac-
counts proved more troublesome.4 The parties stipulated that these trans-
fers did not render the father "insolvent.""0 Thus the second wife acquired
a moiety of one-half of each account, which a creditor could not reach. As to
the remaining half, the decedent retained a power to withdraw the funds
during his lifetime and thereby defeat his spouse's expectancy of taking
them by survival. The court equated this power with a retained power to
revoke trusts, thus subjecting one-half of the mutual fund accounts to pay-
ment of claims against the estate. By focusing on the classification of the
survivor's interest as an expectancy, the court subjected the transferor's re.
tained interest in such transfers to payment of claims iithout inquiry as to
the transferor's state of mind.
As to the surviving spouse's half of the joint accounts, the decision
appears questionable. Even though the transfer could not be set aside as
fraudulent because it did not render the transferors estate insolvent, might
it not be considered a violation of the transferor's contractual obligation
41. In re Estate of Strickland, 181 Neb. 478, 149 N.W.2d 344 (1967) ; In re Estate
of Davis, 20 N.Y.2d 70, 228 N.E.2d 768, 281 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1967).
42. In re Estate of Gelb, 425 Pa. 117, 228 A.2d 357 (1967).
43. In re Granwell, 20 N.Y.2d 91, 228 N.E.2d 779, 281 N.YS.2d 783 (1967).
44. See City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Cannon, 291 N.Y. 125, 51 N.E.2d 674, 45
N.Y.S.2d IXIX (1943).
45. The appellate division had dismissed the son's claim on the ground that no evi-
dence of "actual intent to defraud" had been presented. 25 App. Div. 2d 824, 270
N.Y.S.2d 372 (1st Dep't 1966).
46. A requirement established by N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law § 273.
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under the separation agreement? And might not the promisee recover from
a gratituous transferee any property so transferred?
Pretermitted Heir.-Two cases presented a conflict between the right
to disinherit by express testamentary provision and the operation of anti-
lapse statutes. In one,47 the testator expressly excluded "the issue of my
marriage," and bequeathed his estate to three named individuals and three
charities. Since the individual legatees predeceased him, a son claimed
their legacies as decedent's next of kin. The charitable legatees claimed that
the exclusion of the son bad the effect of constituting them substitute lega.
tees, thus preventing the lapse from occurring. This ingenious but ill.
founded argument was rejected.48 In the other case,4 testatrix bequeathed
property to a sister, expressly excluding the sister's son. The sister pre-
deceased the testatrix, and the son took her legacy by operation of the anti-
lapse statute, 0 since the testatrix manifested no intention to exclude the
nephew from ever enjoying her property; but rather, she omitted him
because she felt certain he would be amply provided for in his mother's
will-including, naturally, assets which the sister would have received under
testatrix' will. This same result has been reached in other lapsed legacy
cases, despite a clear manifestation of intent for complete exclusion."1
The California confusion12 over the effect of boiler plate clauses as
manifestations of intention to exclude children continues."8 Even with the
admission of extrinsic evidence to show decedent's "lack of intent to omit
from his will any provision for" children,14 the cases are difficult to recon-
cile. In the most recent,5 testator's son introduced evidence that he had
visited his father on numerous occasions during the period when the will
was executed, although his parents were separated; that his father kept a
picture of him in his residence; and that his father had given him the
purchase price of an automobile as a high school graduation present. The
47. In re Estate of Levy, 196 So. 2d 225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 201 So.
2d 550 (Fla. 1967).
48. "The intent of the testator not to include his son and heir among the logatees,
as recited in the will, was not accompanied by any language for substitution of another
in the place of a named legatee whose testamentary disposition might lapse. As Is often
the case, the testator did not anticipate lapsed legacies, and made no provision re-
specting them." 196 So. 2d at 230.
49. In re Estate of Jovanopoulos, 51 Misc. 2d 995, 274 N.Y.S.2d 249 (Sur. Ct. 1966).
50. N.Y. Deced. Est. Law § 29 (now EPTL § 3-3.3).
51. E.g., In re Estate of Darmstadter, 53 Misc. 2d 1003, 280 N.Y.S.2d 223 (Sur. Ct.
1967).
52. See Pyle, How to Beat the Pretermitted Heir Statute, 18 Hastings W. 333
(1967).
53. This year's contribution is In re Estate of Bank, 248 Cal. App. 2d 429, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 559 (1967).
54. See Estate of Torregano, 54 Cal. 2d 234, 243, 352 P.2d 505, 510, 5 Cal. Rptr. 137,
142 (1960).
55. In re Estate of Bank, 248 Cal. App. 2d 429, S6 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1967).
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decision went against the son, in favor of brothers and sisters of the de-
cedent, because of a no-contest clause in the will bequeathing S1 to all
persons who could establish any claim against the estate as an "heir at law."
Since the decedent was a lawyer, reasoned the appellate court, he must have
been aware that "heirs" included his childrenP' In the opinion of one
recent commentator,," artificial reasoning of this sort undermines the statu-
tory policy requiring specific intent to exclude. Rhode Island, on the other
hand, has the presumption that an omission of the testator's children from
his will is unintentional.5
The confusion in California over application of the pretermitted heir
statute was further compounded by another intermediate court decision."'
The testatrix bequeathed her estate to a daughter, ith the request that such
portions be distributed to another daughter as the legatee should deem
reasonable and necessary. The court held these words created no trust, and
hence the second daughter took nothing under the will. Her claim as a pre-
termitted heir was also rejected, on the "reasoning" that: (1) -he was
named in the will; (2) she received nothing under the will; therefore (3)
the omission to provide for her was intentional. By this tortured con-
struction, an ineffective attempt to provide for the daughter was converted
into an intentional omission of provision for her.
Iron Curtain Statutes.-Since Matter of Tybusro was decided in 1961,
Polish nationals have received fands subject to administration in New York
under that state's "benefit" statute.01 New York's Attorney General is now
contending, and a surrogate's court has held in Matter of Kina,9 that under
present conditions Polish beneficiaries are not permitted the requisite use,
benefit, and control of funds transmitted to them. Two courts, refusing to
stay proceedings pending determination of the Kina appeals, have ordered
transmission of funds to Poland in reliance on Matter of Tybus.a Other
holdings have authorized transmission of funds to residents of the Soviet
Union. Payment of impounded funds of a Soviet national to a judgment
56. Id. at 434, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 563.
57. "The court should thus scrutinize the vil to see how clearly and strongly the
testator indicated that he had his children in mind, not how clearly and strongly he
indicated an intent to disinherit a general class which could include his children.! Pyle,
supra note 52, at 340.
58. Vance v. Rood, 226 A.2d 143 (RI. 1967).
59. In re Estate of Moore, 61 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Ct. App. 1967).
60. 28 Misc. 2d 278,217 N.Y.S.2d 913 (Sur. Ct. 1961).
61. N.Y. Sur. Ct. Act § 269-a.
62. 49 Misc. 2d 598, 268 N.Y.S.2d 131 (Sur. Ct. 1966). Appeal pending in Appeliate
Division.
63. In re Estate of Krasowski, 28 App. Div. 2d 180, 283 N.Y.S.2d 950 (3d Dep't
1967) ; In re Sikorsli's Estate, 54 Misc. 2d 883, 283 N.Y.S.2d 794 (Sur. Ct. 1967).
64. E.g, In re Estate of Podworski, 53 Misc. 2d 1043, 281 N.Y.S.2d 276 (Sur. Ct.
1967).
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creditor in New York was ordered,65 over a vigorous dissent which noted
that the claimant was the brother of the Soviet citizen and his claim evi-
denced only by a letter from her acknowledging the debt. The dissenter
characterized the claim as a "devious stratagem" in conflict with the policy
of the statute. In a California decision,6" the right of Californians to be-
queath property to citizens of Rumania under California's "reciprocity"
statute was affirmed. 7
After these pages were written, the Supreme Court dealt a death blow
to iron curtain statutes as currently administered.""
IV
TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION
Testamentary Capacity and Undue Influence.-While the obstacles con-
fronting a caveator may render accomplishment of his objective "equally as
formidable as shooting an elephant,""0 the probate jungle exhibits no short-
age of aspiring marksmen. The most popular weapon is lack of testamentary
capacity; during the period under review, however, it proved rather in-
effective.
In a Wyoming case,70 a guardian had been appointed for the decedent
within 6 months after the date of execution of the will. The guardianship
petition and order indicated that the proceedings were necessitated because
the decedent, then a man of 85, had become unable to manage his prop-
erty. Evidence was admitted in the caveat proceeding tending to show that
decedent had "slipped" considerably, both physically and mentally, during
the year prior to the execution of the will. Nevertheless, a directed verdict
for propounders was affurmed on appeaL 1 Another decision held that a
probate judge erred in taking judicial notice, in a caveat proceeding, of
65. In re Estate of Leikind, 28 App. Div. 2d 884, 282 N.Y.S.2d 47 (2d Dep't 1967).
66. In re Estate of Chichernea, 424 P.2d 687, 57 Cal. Rptr. 135 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
67. Cal. Prob. Code § 259. For a recent criticism of Iron Curtain statutes, see Note,
1967 U. Ill. L F. 141 (1967).
68. Zschernig v. Miller, 88 S. Ct. 664 (1968).
69. In re Will of Simone, 53 Misc. 2d 314, 315, 278 N.Y.S.2d 928, 929 (Sur. Ct.
1967).
70. In re Estate of Morton, 428 P.2d 725 (Wyo. 1967).
71. Perhaps the most significant factors were these: (1) The offered will was very
similar to an earlier one, except for the deletion of a bequest to the caveators, decedent's
nephews; (2) A church was the residuary legatee of both wills; (3) The scrivener
testified that the decedent told him that the caveators "had enough and ho wasn't going
to leave them any more". 428 P.2d at 732. An attempted caveat of an inconsistent second
will failed, however, in In re Will of Villani, 28 App. Div. 2d 76, 281 N.Y.S.2d 1019
(1st Dep't 1967).
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orders he had entered with respect to testatrix' mental competency before
and after the execution of the will, since these proceedings were not made
part of the record.72 A third case upheld the trial court's refusal to permit
lay opinion testimony about decedent's testamentary capacity because the
qualifying testimony had not established facts sufficient to justify an
opinion.73
In two cases, caveators succeeded in establishing undue influence on
the part of a sister of one testatriW4 and the recently-hired practical nurse
of another.75 A most professionally embarrassing case arose in Rhode
Island,T where a clerk of probate court was held to have procured the
execution of a will naming himself as beneficiary through abuse of a con-
fidential relationship with the testatrix.'7
Execution.-A recent review of the wills statutes regarding for-
malities of execution concludes with a proposal that would authorize the
probate of signed, but otherwise ineffectively executed, instruments where
the trier of fact is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the proferred
document "represents in whole or in part said testator's bona fide attempt
to prescribe the devolution of his property at his death." ' Such a curative
act would prove useful in cases where there is little doubt that a defectively
executed instrument was intended to operate as a will; it could, perhaps,
have saved the instrument in at least three eases decided during the period
under review.79
72. In re Estate of Simpkins, 195 So. 2d 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
73. Sachs v. Little, 245 Md. 343, 226 A.2d 283 (1967).
74. Pearce v. Cross, 414 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. 1967).
75. Belcher v. Somerville, 413 S.W.2d 620 (Ky. App. 1967).
76. Appollonio v. Kenyon, 225 A2 778 (RI.L 1957).
77. A jury verdict that the testatrix lacked testamentary capacity was also alfirmed.
78. Comment, An Analysis of the History and Present Status of American Wills
Statutes, 28 Ohio St. LJ. 293, 322 (1967).
79. In In re Estate of Hazelwood, 57 Cal. Rptr. 332 (Ct. App. 1967), a holographic
will failed for lack of a complete date: the year "1965" appeared, but not the month and day.
Although the court concluded that "there is no doubt that the document 'iritten by
[testatrix] was executed with testamentary intent," it was obligated to rever~e the order
admitting the document to probate. In Seab v. Seab, 203 So. 2d 478 (Mik. 1957), a
married couple signed an instrument purporting to be their last 'Oill and testament,
acknowledged it as such before a member of the County Board of Supervisors, and filed
it for record in the county will books; the vills statute requires two st.es.
The effect of the proposed statute on Land v. Succession of Newsom, 193 So. 2d 411
(La. 1967) is less certain. There, the statute required that each sheet constituting the
will be signed; testatrix signed only the latter of two sheets which were stapled together.
Whether such an instrument was "signed by the testator," as required by the proposed
statute, is problematical.
The statute might also avert malpractice litigation. See text accompanying notes
82-89 infra.
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In an unusual case, an unsigned copy of a will was admitted to pro-
bate in Pennsylvania. 0 The signed and executed original, although known
to have been in decedent's possession 9 years before her death, was not
found among her effects. The copy was found, however, in an envelope con-
taining her apartment lease and an unsigned copy of her deceased husband's
will. Over a strong dissent, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed an
order admitting the copy to probate. The presumption that the will was
destroyed animo revocandi was rebutted, according to the majority, by
evidence of testatrix' poor eyesight, carelessness, and moving of residence;
the dissenters contended that this evidence was too equivocal to meet the
"positive, clear, and satisfactory" requirement 1 for overcoming the pre-
sumption.
North Carolina adopted the majority rule that probate of a validly
executed will cannot be set aside upon evidence that it failed to effectuate
the testator's intent due to a draftsman's error.82 Such errors are likely to
become more costly after Price v. Holmes. 83 There the administrator of a
disappointed legatee sued the lay draftsman of a will"' for negligence and
breach of warranty after probate of the purported will was denied because
of irregularities in execution and attestation. 5 The legatee had survived the
decedent, dying a few days before decedent's will was declared inadmissible
to probate. The legatee's administrator sought to recover the amount she
would have received had the will been valid, plus punitive damages. De-
fendant successfully contended that the cause of action in tort did not accrue
until the will was declared invalid; since the legatee was dead at that time,
the cause of action did not survive. Against the claimed breach of warranty,
defendant asserted a 3-year statute of limitations. The action had been
filed within 3 years of the judgment nullifying the will, but more than 3
years from the date of execution and the decedent's death. The Kansas
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's summary judgment for the de-
fendant and held that the cause of action had accrued more than 3 years
80. In re Estate of Ervien, 427 Pa. 64, 233 A.2d 887 (1967).
81. See In re Murray's Estate, 404 Pa. 120, 129, 171 A.2d 171, 176 (1961); In re
Dalbey's Estate, 326 Pa. 285, 288, 192 A. 129, 130 (1937).
82. In re Will of Cobb, 271 N.C. 307, 156 S.E.2d 285 (1967). A recent survey and
analysis of American law relating to fraud and mistake in wills Is Henderson, Mistake
and Fraud in Wills-Part I: A Comparative Analysis of Existing Law, 47 B.UL. Roy.
303 (1967). Proposals for change appear in Henderson, Mistake and Fraud in WiS-.
Part II: A Suggested Statutory Departure, 47 B.U.L. Rev. 461 (1967).
83. 198 Kan. 100, 422 P.2d 976 (1967).
84. The draftsman was a banker, who prepared the will at the request of tho
decedent. The opinion does not disclose whether or not he received any compensation
for his "services."
85. See In re Estate of Weber, 192 Kan. 258, 387 P.2d 165 (1963).
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previously;88 that it survived the legatees death,"7 but that the statute of
limitations was tolled while the proceedings to determine the validity of the
will were in progress8 8 As to the alleged breach of warranty, plaintiff was
entitled to a day in court.
The decision may have an inhibitory effect on unauthorized legal prac-
tice; it may also signal greater exposure to liability on the part of the legal
profession itself. Unlike the rule against perpetuities, sO laws relating to
formalities of execution of wills are generally sufficiently clear and straight-
forward so that failure of compliance by a licensed attorney would seem to
be clearly actionable. Price v. Holmes should receive thoughtful considera-
tion by every member of the probate bar.
Joint and Mutual Wills.--"The extensive litigation concerning joint
and mutual wills should be a caveat that such wills should be avoided or the
parties' intent be manifested in clear and unambiguous language to indicate
whether or not the parties -wish to be bound."10
The soundness of this statement, which itself echoes earlier warnings,"0
cannot be doubted; yet the Survey year produced decisions by appellate
courts of no fewer than five jurisdictions: Florida, 2 Iowa, 3 Missouri,"
New York,95 and Wisconsin. 9 These cases are must reading for any prac-
titioner who persists in the use of joint and mutual wills and no attempt
_ill be made to summarize their holdings.
86. The court found it unnecessary to specify 'whether the cause of action arozse
at the time of execution or at the testator's death, since both events occurred more than
3 years prior to the commencement of the action.
87. Kansas law provides for survival of causes of action for breach of contract. Kan.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 60-1801 (1964) ; Cory v. Troth, 170 Kan. 50, 223 P.2d 1008 (1950).
88. "Before she could proceed against [defendant] for damage.% we believe it vuould
be incumbent on [the legatee], or some other interested party, to attempt, at least, the
probate of Edecedent's] will and only when such endeavor failed vwould [legatee] have
been able, under any theory, to recover from [defendant]." 422 P.2d 976, 932 (1967).
Since plaintiff was prevented from suing defeidant until the probate proceeding had
been finally determined, the statute vas tolled during its pendency. In re Estato of
Brasfield, 168 Kan. 376, 214 P.2d 305 (1950).
89. In Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), it
was held that an action could be maintained by disappointed legatees against a licensed
attorney who drafted a will containing a bequest viich violated the rule against per.
petuities. Defendant escaped liability, however, because the court held that his error uas
of the sort that any attorney of ordinary skill might make. It constituted neither negli.
gence nor breach of contneLt.
90. In re Aquilino's Will, 53 Misc. 2d 811, 813, 280 N.Y.S.2d 85, 87 (Sur. Ct. 1967).
91. E.g, B. Sparks, Contracts to Make gills 192 (1956).
92. Laragione v. Hagan, 195 So. 2d 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
93. Floerchinger v. Williams, 148 N.W.2d 410 (Iowa 1967).
94. Wimp v. Collett, 414 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. 1967).
95. Rubenstein v. Mueller, 19 N.Y.2d 228, 225 NE2d 540, 278 N.YS.2d 845 (1967).
See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
96. In re Estate of Hoeppner, 32 Wis. 2d 447, 145 N.W.2d 754 (1966). Sea aho
Pederson v. First Nat'l Bank, 31 Wis. 2d 649, 143 N.W.2d 425 (1956).
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Lapse.-An Indiana intermediate court, in a case of first impression,
rejected the common law distinction between lapsed and void legacies,
and held an antilapse statute applicable although the legatees were deceased
when the will was made."'
Ademption.-Recent decisions manifest a judicial preference for the
"intent" theory of ademption over the "presence" test. California is one of
the leaders in this regard: in one case, no ademption occurred where spe.
ciflically bequeathed property was sold by the decedent and the proceeds
deposited in a savings account; 98 in another, where specifically devised
realty was taken in condemnation proceedings and the proceeds used to buy
other realty, the devisee was entitled to the second parcel; 0 and in a third,
no ademption occurred when specifically devised realty was later transferred
to a wholly-owned corporation.0 0 Two additional jurisdictions have held
that sale of specifically bequeathed assets by guardians of incompetents does
not adeem the bequests. 10' However, Kansas continues to follow the "pres.
ence" test and has recently held that a contract of sale adeems a specific
devise.Y0 2
When a stock split or dividend intervenes between the execution of a
will bequeathing corporate shares and the testator's death, the question
arises as to whether the increment is added to the original bequest. The
majority view holds that it is, if the bequest is specific, but not if the be-
quest is general or demonstrative.Y3 Rhode Island has rejected this classi-
fication,"' finding support in a Pennsylvania decision.. 5 for its holding
that the increment follows the original shares in the absence of the mani-
festation of contrary intention. This is a special rule, applicable to stock
splits only; in other cases, the classification test will still be employed.
Charitable Bequests.-An Ohio intermediate court refused to apply
97. McAvoy v. Sammons, 224 N.E:2d 323 (Ind. App. 1967).
98. In Te Estate of Newsome, 248 Cal. App. 2d 861, 56 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1967).
99. In re Estate of Shubin, 252 Cal. App. 2d 640, 60 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1967).
100. In re Estate of Creed, 255 Cal. App. 2d 100, 63 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1967). Since
the specifically devised realty was the corporation's only asset, the court hold that the
stock became the property of the devisee.
101. Our Lady of Lourdes v. Vanator, 422 P.2d 74 (Idaho 1967) ; Grant v. Banko,
270 N.C. 473, 155 S.E.2d 87 (1967).
102. In re Estate of Snyder, 199 Kan. 487, 430 P.2d 212 (1967).
103. 6 Page, fills § 48.6 (Bowe-Parker rev. 1962).
104. Egavian v. Egavian, 232 A.2d 789 (R.1. 1967).
105. In In re McFerren's Estate, 365 Pa. 490, 76 A.2d 759 (1950), although it was
conceded that the bequest of stock was a general legacy, the court held that the incre.
ment of shares representing a stock split should be awarded to the legatee. The reason.
ing was that the testatrix would not have intended a mere change in form to reduce the
value of the legacy. The Rhode Island court converted this reasoning into a presumption
of general application. Presumably, the presumption extends to stock dividends, which
also do not alter in any way the "substance of the testator's total interest or rights In
the corporation." 232 A.2d at 793.
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that state's mortmain statute °'0 although the codicil containing the chari-
table bequest was executed less than 2 months before the testator's death.
Had the bequest been invalidated, the assets would have funded a trust for
the testator's grandchildren established under an earlier will. Testator was
survived -by his children. The court reasoned that the statute was designed
to protect those who would take by intestacy, and that since the grand-
children were not of the protected class, they could not invoke the statute
against the charitable legatee1 07 If this decision is followed, the Ohio
mortmain statute may be nullified by an estate planner who need only pro-
vide a substitutional gift to some noncharitable legatee other than those who
will take by intestate succession.
New York's mortmain statute10 s limits bequests for "any benevolent,
charitable, literary, scientific, religious or missionary society, association,
corporation or purpose" to one-half of the testator's estate. When, in a
recent case, a testatrix left her entire estate to the City of New York, her
next of kin attempted to invoke the "conduit theory" to show that over one-
half of New York expenditures are directed toward the purposes named in
the statute. The surrogate, however, adopted the "entity theory," holding
that social welfare programs are legitimate governmental functions; hence,
New York is not a charitable corporation °D This reasoning ignores the
words "or purpose" in the statute, as well as the argument that a purpose is no
less charitable or benevolent merely because government is engaged in
furthering it. This case raises an issue of sufficient importance to warrant
more serious consideration and closer analysis.
Construction.-Attempts to persuade courts to read new provisions into
wills, or rewrite existing provisions, met with mixed success. One court
refused to correct an inadvertant (and costly) exercise of a power of ap-
pointment; 110 another refused to fill a dispositive gap in order to avoid
partial intestacy.' In a third case, however, an apparent bequest of a
one-half undivided interest in an estate was converted into a class gift to
avoid partial intestacy.' 2
The eligibility of adopted children to share in class gifts continues to
be a much-litigated issue. Where the adoption occurs after the testator's
death, the "stranger to the adoption" presumption is still likely to exclude
106. Ohio Rev. Code § 2107.06 (1954) invalidated charitable bequests where the
testator was survived by lineal descendants and the will was executed less than one year
prior to his death. The statute was substantially modified in 1965. Ohio Rev. Coda
§ 2107.06 (Supp. 1966).
107. Central Nat'1 Bank v. Morris, 10 Ohio App. 2d 225, 227 N.E.2d 418 (19%7).
108. N.Y. EPTL § 5-3.3.
109. In re Klitenk's Estate, 53 Misc. 2d 955, 280 N.YdS.2d 488 (Sur. Ct. 197).
110. In re Estate of Jaekel, 424 Pa. 433, 227 A.2d 851 (1967).
111. W ight v. Benttinen, 226 N.E.2d 194 (Mass. 1967).
112. In re Estate of Devin, 230 A2d 735 (N.H. 1967).
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the adopted child from sharing in a class gift,""3 although in a recent case
where the testator was himself the adopting parent, a converse presumption
was applied despite the use of technical terminology such as "issue" in
describing the class.' 4
113. See Minary v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 419 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1967);
Hein v. Hein, 431 P.2d 316 (Okla. 1967); Security Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Willim,
153 S.E.2d 114 (W.Va. 1967).
114. In re Nicol's Trust, 19 N.Y.2d 207, 225 N.E.2d 530, 278 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1967).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
